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C.A. V. WILLIAM S. HART UNION SCHOOL 
DISTRICT: CALIFORNIA’S SHIFT IN 
VICARIOUS LIABILITY LEAVES SCHOOL 
DISTRICTS WITH NO PROTECTION 
Catherine Blumenfeld* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Roselyn Hubbell was the head guidance counselor at Golden 
Valley High School until police arrested her when she checked into a 
motel with an underage male student.1 Following this incident, a 
second student, C.A., sued Hubbell and the William S. Hart Union 
High School District (“the District”) claiming that both the 
individual and the public entity were responsible for the sexual abuse 
to which Hubbell had subjected him.2 C.A.’s allegations eventually 
led to the C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School District 
(“William S. Hart”)3 lawsuit. Even more disturbing than the sexual 
abuse details that C.A. revealed to the court4 were C.A.’s allegations 
that the District had known that “Hubbell had engaged in unlawful 
sexually-related conduct with minors in the past.”5 
The California Supreme Court’s unanimous holding in William 
                                                          
 * J.D. Candidate, May 2014, Loyola Law School Los Angeles; B.A. English, Indiana 
University, Bloomington. I sincerely thank Paul T. Hayden for his academic and legal guidance. 
Even more appreciation is due to my loving and supportive parents, Andrew and Jeanne 
Blumenfeld, who have made my education possible. 
 1. Sharon Cotal & Jim Holt, Ex-Counselor Arrested, SANTA CLARITA VALLEY SIGNAL 
(Aug. 15, 2008, 5:03 AM), http://www.signalscv.com/archives/2356/. 
 2. Brian Charles, Hubbell Learns Her Fate, SANTA CLARITA VALLEY SIGNAL 
(Apr. 11, 2009, 4:55 AM), http://www.signalscv.com/archives/11819/. 
 3. 270 P.3d 699 (Cal. 2012). 
 4. Appellant accused Hubbell of, among other things, forcing him to have sexual 
intercourse; “kissing him on his lips, face, chest, penis, testicles and other areas; masturbating 
him; and performing fellatio on him.” Opening Brief of Appellant John AC Doe at *5–6, C.A. v. 
William S. Hart Union High Sch. Dist., 117 Cal. Rptr. 3d 283 (Ct. App. 2010) (No. B217982) 
2009 CA App. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 6336. C.A. was referred to as John AC Doe in earlier litigation 
against Hubbell and the District. Both names refer to the same individual. See C.A. v. William S. 
Hart Union High Sch. Dist., 117 Cal. Rptr. 3d 283, 283 (Ct. App. 2010). 
 5. William S. Hart, 270 P.3d at 702. 
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S. Hart established a new standard of vicarious liability for public 
school districts whose administrative and supervisory employees 
knew or should have known of an employee’s propensity for sexual 
misconduct and, yet, hired and inadequately supervised the 
employee.6 The court remanded C.A.’s case to the court of appeal to 
determine whether this standard applied to the William S. Hart 
Union School District.7 
The court’s decision in William S. Hart may seem fair in light of 
recent reports of sexual harassment and abuse committed by school 
employees against students.8 However, this Comment argues that the 
holding improperly increases the standard of care school districts 
owe to their students. School districts have long been exempt from 
the role of “insurers of the physical safety of [their] students,”9 but 
William S. Hart changes that. Now, public school districts must more 
vigilantly police interactions between students and teachers to ensure 
that the districts do not violate the court’s vague “knew or should 
have known” standard of care. 
Part II of this Comment recounts the facts of William S. Hart. 
Part III details the court of appeal’s decision in favor of the District 
and examines the unanimous California Supreme Court decision, 
which overturned the court of appeal and other case precedent. Part 
IV analyzes the shift in the California Supreme Court’s approach to 
vicarious liability for public school districts from the prior leading 
case of John R. v. Oakland Unified School District.10 This part 
argues that, while students should be protected, the court’s new 
approach to vicarious liability goes too far. An assessment of the 
California media’s focus on sexual harassment and abuse by 
educators supports this position. The enhanced attention the media 
                                                          
 6. Id. at 711. 
 7. Id. 
 8. See, e.g., Barbara Jones, Sex Scandal, Cover-Up Claims at LAUSD: Former 
Superintendent Ramon Cortines’ Accuser Speaks Out, DAILY NEWS L.A. (Aug. 25, 2012, 
6:40 PM), http://www.dailynews.com/ci_21401483/sex-scandal-cover-up-claims-at-lausd-former; 
Dave Marquis, Sac. Unified Employee Reinstated After Sex Harassment Probe, ABC NEWS 10 
(Sept. 20, 2012, 10:45 PM), http://www.news10.net/news/article/210422/2/School-employee 
-reinstated-after-sex-harassment-investigation; Principal Accused of Sexual Harassment Takes 
Leave, NEWS 10 ABC (Sept. 18, 2012, 11:36 PM), http://www.news10.net/news/article/210106/2 
/Principal-accused-of-sexual-harrassment-takes-leave. 
 9. William S. Hart, 270 P.3d at 704 (quoting Dailey v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 470 P.2d 
360, 363 (Cal. 1970)). 
 10. 769 P.2d 948 (Cal. 1989). 
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gives to these types of crimes makes them seem more prevalent than 
the national statistics indicate.11 Furthermore, the court’s expansion 
of liability leaves school districts without necessary safeguards, 
which may hinder their ability to provide students with well-rounded 
educations. Finally, had the court used language more similar to the 
New York Court of Appeals in Mirand v. City of New York,12 the 
decision would have protected students without placing additional 
unnecessary burdens on school districts. Part V concludes that the 
standard established by the court is overly broad to a fault and has 
stripped public school districts of the protection they were previously 
afforded. 
II.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
While C.A. was a high school student in the William S. Hart 
Union School District, his school directed him to see Hubbell for 
counseling.13 Hubbell claimed that she wanted to help C.A. improve 
his grades.14 Under the guise of accomplishing this goal, she began 
spending time with him on and off school premises and driving him 
home from school each day.15 The fourteen-year-old student alleged 
that during this time Hubbell had sexually abused him by performing 
fellatio on him, requiring him to perform cunnilingus on her, and 
forcing him to have sexual intercourse with her, among other 
things.16 The abuse continued from approximately January 2007 
through September 2007.17 As a result of Hubbell’s inappropriate 
conduct, C.A. suffered emotional distress, nervousness, anxiety, and 
fear.18 
In July 2008, Hubbell pleaded not guilty to a misdemeanor 
charge of one count of annoying or molesting a child under the age 
of eighteen.19 Hubbell originally had faced a felony charge for child 
                                                          
 11. See infra Part IV.B. 
 12. 637 N.E.2d 263 (N.Y. 1994). 
 13. William S. Hart, 270 P.3d at 702. 
 14. Id.; Opening Brief of Appellant John AC Doe, supra note 4, at *4. 
 15. William S. Hart, 270 P.3d at 702. 
 16. Opening Brief of Appellant John AC Doe, supra note 4, at *5–6. 
 17. William S. Hart, 270 P.3d at 702. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Sharon Cotal, No Felony for Ex-Counselor: Charges Reduced for Former Golden Valley 
Employee, SANTA CLARITA VALLEY SIGNAL (Sept. 3, 2008, 5:03 AM), http://www.signalscv 
.com/archives/2693/. 
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endangerment and contributing to the delinquency of a minor due to 
C.A.’s and a second student’s allegations against her,20 but the 
charges were reduced based on the available evidence.21 The court 
ultimately required Hubbell to register as a sex offender and 
sentenced her to three years of probation and thirty days of 
community service.22 
In January 2009, C.A. sued Hubbell and the District.23 The 
District subsequently filed a demurrer to the complaint24 in which it 
argued in part that C.A.’s causes of action for negligent supervision, 
hiring, and retention failed to provide statutory authority for holding 
a public entity liable.25 Additionally, the District claimed that 
allegations of negligent hiring and supervision did not apply to a 
public entity.26 
On June 4, 2009, the trial court sustained the demurrer and 
dismissed the action as to the District without leave to amend.27 In a 
divided decision, the court of appeal affirmed the trial court’s 
holding.28 The majority held that C.A.’s claims of liability for 
negligent hiring, supervision, and retention were not viable because 
C.A. failed to prove that the District had breached a statutorily 
imposed duty.29 
In February 2011, the California Supreme Court granted review 
and ultimately overruled the court of appeal’s decision.30 It held that 
public school districts can incur vicarious liability for the negligence 
of any administrator or supervisor who knew or should have known 
that the employee he or she hired and retained had a propensity for 
sexual misconduct.31 
                                                          
 20. Id.; Cotal & Holt, supra note 1. 
 21. Cotal, supra note 19. 
 22. Charles, supra note 2. 
 23. C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High Sch. Dist., 117 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 283, 286 (Ct. App. 
2010). The causes of action included: (1) negligent supervision, hiring, and retention; (2) 
negligent failure to warn, train, or educate; (3) constructive fraud; (4) intentional infliction of 
emotional distress; (5) sexual battery; (6) assault; (7) sexual harassment; (8) gender violence; and 
(9) unfair business practices. Id. at 287. 
 24. Id. at 287. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High Sch. Dist., 270 P.3d 699, 703 (Cal. 2012). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 702. 
 31. Id. at 711. 
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III.  REASONING OF THE COURTS 
Both the court of appeal and the California Supreme Court heard 
C.A.’s case.32 The court of appeal’s decision relied heavily on 
traditional application of California law, which does not hold a 
public entity liable without a statutory basis.33 The court also utilized 
case precedent, which applied the theory of respondeat superior to 
immunize public entities from liability if the employee’s act occurred 
outside the scope of his or her employment.34 The California 
Supreme Court overturned the court of appeal’s decision and other 
case precedent to establish a new form of liability for public school 
districts.35 Subpart A provides the court of appeal’s traditional 
reasoning for affirming the trial court’s decision to sustain the school 
district’s demurrer. Subpart B discusses the California Supreme 
Court’s logic in reaching its unanimous holding, which overruled the 
court of appeal’s decision and radically departed from conventional 
case law.36 The California Supreme Court’s decision established that 
a public school district may be liable for negligently hiring and 
supervising an employee who it knew or should have known had a 
propensity for sexual misconduct with students.37 Ultimately, this 
new standard increases the potential liability for California public 
school districts from the prior narrow standard of liability based on 
respondeat superior.38 
A.  The Court of Appeal’s Traditional Opinion 
The court of appeal applied the general rule that a public entity 
employer may only be vicariously liable for torts its employees 
committed within the scope of their employment.39 Since C.A. failed 
to show how Hubbell’s sexual misconduct had fallen within the 
                                                          
 32. Id. at 701–03. 
 33. C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High Sch. Dist., 117 Cal. Rptr. 3d 283, 291 (Ct. App. 
2010). 
 34. Id. at 288. 
 35. William S. Hart, 270 P.3d at 711. 
 36. See infra Part IV.A. 
 37. William S. Hart, 270 P.3d at 710–11. 
 38. Compare id. (holding that public school districts may be subject to vicarious liability for 
the negligence of their administrative employees resulting in sexual injuries of students), with 
John R. v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 769 P.2d 948, 953–57 (Cal. 1989) (holding that public 
school districts are immune from vicarious liability for the sexual misconduct of their 
employees). 
 39. C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High Sch. Dist., 117 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 288. 
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scope of her employment, the court held that the District could not be 
vicariously liable for Hubbell’s actions.40 
In addressing the causes of action for negligent supervision, 
hiring, and retention, the court held that the District could not be 
vicariously liable because C.A. had failed to assert a statutory basis 
for its liability.41 In California, a statutory basis is required for a 
plaintiff to assign tort liability to a public entity, such as a school 
district.42 The court further found that no mandatory duty existed that 
required school districts to protect students from sexual harassment 
or abuse.43 Although the court recognized the existence of a special 
relationship between a school district and its students, it noted that 
the existence of this relationship did not create a mandatory duty to 
act absent a statutory basis for liability.44 
The court of appeal treated this case as a straightforward 
application of established case precedent and California law. 
Subsequently, the California Supreme Court created a new and 
ambiguous approach when it overruled the court of appeal’s 
decision. 
B.  The California Supreme Court’s New Approach 
The California Supreme Court began its decision by finding a 
statutory basis where none previously had existed and by creating a 
more stringent mandatory duty arising out of a special relationship.45 
These two factors allowed the court to determine that a public school 
district may be liable for negligent hiring and supervision of its 
administrative and supervisory employees who knew or should have 
known of an employee’s sexual proclivities toward students.46 
Consequently, the court created a wider basis for liability for public 
                                                          
 40. Id. at 289. This included the causes of action for sexual battery, assault, sexual 
harassment, gender violence, constructive fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. Both California Government Code sections 815(a) and 815.6 indicate the necessity of 
an authorizing statute. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 815(a) (2012 West) (“Except as otherwise 
provided by statute . . . a public entity is not liable for an injury.”); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 815.6 
(2012 West) (providing that a public entity may be found liable when it is under a mandatory 
duty imposed by an “enactment,” which serves the purpose of protecting against a specific risk). 
 43. C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High Sch. Dist., 117 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 291. 
 44. Id. 
 45. C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High Sch. Dist., 270 P.3d 699, 703, 704–05 (Cal. 2012). 
 46. See id. at 703, 704–05, 711. 
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school districts.47 
1.  Statutory Framework 
While the court of appeal reasoned that C.A. had failed to 
provide statutory authority for his causes of action for negligent 
hiring, supervision, or retention, the California Supreme Court easily 
concluded that such a statutory basis existed.48 The California 
Supreme Court relied on California Government Code section 815.2, 
which states, in part, that a public entity may be liable for injuries 
proximately caused by an employee’s act that falls within the scope 
of his or her employment.49 Section 815.2(a) codifies the concept of 
vicarious liability.50 The court’s reliance on this statute, therefore, 
precluded an application of direct liability in this case. The court 
used the respondeat superior framework of section 815.2 and its 
interpretation of the standard of care imposed on school employees 
to establish that a public school district may be vicariously liable for 
injuries caused by negligent behavior, such as ineffective 
supervision.51 However, the court recognized that the requirements 
of causation and duty would limit this potential liability.52 
2.  Existence of a Special Relationship 
After establishing a statutory basis for liability, the court 
confronted the issue of whether a special relationship exists in order 
to impose a heightened duty of care on public school districts.53 The 
court noted that California law requires school districts and their 
employees to supervise students’ conduct while on school grounds 
                                                          
 47. See Answer to Petition for Review, William S. Hart, 270 P.3d 699 (No. S188982) 2011 
CA S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 182, at *3–4, *9–10 (reasoning that the law was well established to 
preclude liability and that were the court to hold for the petitioner it would “unsettle established 
law and statutory norms”). 
 48. William S. Hart, 270 P.3d at 703. 
 49. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 815.2(a) (2012 West). 
 50. Compare BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 998 (9th ed. 2009) (“[L]iability that a supervisory 
party (such as an employer) bears for the actionable conduct of a subordinate or associate (such as 
an employee) based on the relationship between the two parties.”), with CAL. GOV’T CODE 
§ 815.2(a) (“A public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of an 
employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment if the act or omission would, 
apart from this section, have given rise to a cause of action against that employee or his personal 
representative.”). 
 51. William S. Hart, 270 P.3d at 708–09. 
 52. Id. at 709–10. 
 53. Id. at 704–05. 
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and to enforce regulations necessary for students’ protection.54 This 
general duty subjects school personnel to a uniform standard of care, 
which compels them to act as reasonable persons would under the 
same or similar circumstances.55 
Since students are required to attend school and school 
personnel have power over students on school premises, the court 
concluded that a special relationship exists among the school district, 
the district’s employees, and the students.56 This special relationship 
imposes a heightened standard of care on school personnel, such as a 
duty to use reasonable measures to protect students from foreseeable 
injury caused by a third party.57 The court’s reasoning directly 
conflicted with the court of appeal’s decision, which opined that the 
special relationship between a school district and its students did not 
create mandatory duties.58 
The California Supreme Court used the presence of a special 
relationship to expand a public school district’s potential liability.59 
However, the court intended this factor to help guard against liability 
for other public entities in which no special relationship exists.60 The 
court provided additional limitations in its discussion of causation 
and duty. 
3.  The Limiting Role of Causation and Duty 
The court restricted the scope and effect of its holding through 
the required negligence elements of causation and duty.61 For 
example, the court proposed that proving causation might be difficult 
                                                          
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High Sch. Dist., 117 Cal. Rptr. 3d 283, 291 (Ct. App. 
2010) (citing Mosley v. San Bernardino City Unified Sch. Dist., 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d 724, 727 (Ct. 
App. 2005)). 
 59. Compare William S. Hart, 270 P.3d at 704–05 (reasoning that the special relationship 
imposes additional obligations on a school district beyond what is generally owed by other public 
entities or individuals), with C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High Sch. Dist., 117 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 
291(reasoning that the special relationship does not, by itself, create liability). 
 60. One such case where no special relationship exists is de Villers v. County of San Diego, 
67 Cal. Rptr. 3d 253, 258 (Ct. App. 2007), where the plaintiff filed a claim of public liability for 
the murder of the husband of a coroner’s office employee. In that case, the court held that the 
county was not vicariously liable for the employee’s homicidal acts, in part because no special 
relationship existed between the employee’s supervisors and coworkers, and the victim. Id. at 
260–61. 
 61. William S. Hart, 270 P.3d at 709–10. 
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when an individual defendant did not have authority over the entity’s 
hiring or firing practices.62 This limitation might affect the outcome 
of C.A.’s remanded case.63 
On remand, C.A. will need to establish that a District 
employee’s recommendation to hire Hubbell or failure to recommend 
that the District fire Hubbell was a substantial factor in causing the 
District to hire and retain Hubbell.64 This may be difficult given the 
hiring and firing practices within the District.65 
The hiring and termination of the District’s employees is the 
responsibility of a governing board rather than of individual 
administrators.66 For the school to fire an employee, the governing 
board and a commission on professional competence are required to 
take action.67 Although administrators and supervisors may 
recommend that an individual be hired or fired, the effect that these 
actions would have on the governing board’s ultimate decision is 
unclear.68 Therefore, it is possible that the court of appeal will not 
view the District’s hiring and firing procedures as a substantial cause 
of C.A.’s sexual abuse. If C.A. cannot establish the causation 
element of his negligence action, the court will not be able to find the 
District liable.69 The California Supreme Court treated the causation 
element as an important limitation on its decision for future litigation 
against public entities.70 
The court also focused on the duty element of a negligence 
analysis by evaluating when a special relationship will give rise to a 
duty to take, or abstain from taking, a particular course of action.71 
The court noted that a public entity’s duty to an individual is 
implicated by a factual assessment of whether the resulting injury 
                                                          
 62. Id. at 709. 
 63. See id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 705–06. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 705. 
 68. Id. at 705–06. 
 69. Id. at 709. The court noted that, while the school principal’s recommendations to the 
governing board might carry significant weight, recommendations made by other District 
employees would not be as influential. Id. Consequently, an individual District employee who is 
not responsible for hiring or retention decisions would not be subjected to individual liability. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 709–10. 
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was foreseeable.72 The court reasoned that little or no blame could be 
attributed to a person or entity’s action or inaction if that defendant 
did not know or should not have known of the danger a victim 
faced.73 The court left open for future interpretation what would 
constitute inappropriate action or inaction that would lead a student 
to suffer a foreseeable injury.74 
Despite these limitations, the court’s new public-entity standard 
of liability places an additional burden on school districts to closely 
monitor their administrators’ and supervisors’ actions.75 Such 
liability is only somewhat curtailed by the characteristic limitations 
of a negligence action.76 As a result of this new law, the court 
remanded the case to the court of appeal to determine if the District 
was vicariously liable for C.A.’s injuries.77 Consequently, although a 
new standard has been set, it remains unclear how the court’s 
decision will affect C.A. 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
The court carefully noted that its William S. Hart decision 
continues the California practice established in John R. of 
immunizing public school districts from vicarious liability for its 
employees’ intentional sexual misconduct.78 Yet, the court’s focus on 
negligent hiring, supervising, and retaining still deviated from 
California’s twenty-year practice of protecting public school districts 
from liability arising out of sexual harassment suits. The following 
analysis proposes that the court’s approach in William S. Hart 
incorrectly expanded public school districts’ potential liability from 
the John R. standard. In so doing, the court left public school districts 
unprotected and ignored more practical options for creating a 
sufficiently specific standard of care. 
                                                          
 72. Id. at 710. 
 73. Id. 
 74. See id. (including only one example that “it is not generally foreseeable . . . that a hiring 
recommendation made by an employee outside an organization’s circles of authority and 
influence will cause harm to a third party” but not referencing any specific examples of what 
would constitute foreseeable injury caused by types of action or inaction). 
 75. Id. at 711 (citing John R. v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 769 P.2d 948, 956 (Cal. 1989)). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
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A.  Saying Good-Bye to the John R. Safety Net 
The California Supreme Court decided John R. in 1989.79 Since 
then, it has been binding case precedent for claims of public school 
districts’ vicarious liability for sexual harassment or abuse of 
students committed by a district employee.80 In John R., the 
California Supreme Court established that the doctrine of respondeat 
superior did not apply to public school districts for sexual harassment 
claims.81 The court premised its holding on the understanding that 
teachers’ sexual misconduct did not arise out of their “job-created 
authority” over students.82 Consequently, the John R. court found 
that sexual misconduct falls outside the scope of teachers’ 
employment.83 The court reasoned that imposing liability on public 
school districts in this context would result in an “unacceptable risk 
that school districts would be dissuaded from permitting teachers to 
interact with their students on any but the most formal and 
supervised basis.”84 
In William S. Hart, the court did not overrule John R., but rather 
created a wider basis for liability. In John R., the court narrowly 
focused on public school districts’ vicarious liability for sexual abuse 
committed by teachers.85 In comparison, the William S. Hart court 
focused more broadly on school districts’ potential liability for the 
negligent supervision of all administrative or supervisory school 
district employees.86 This change in approach indicates that a societal 
shift has occurred since the John R. decision, mainly as a result of 
increased media attention.87 
                                                          
 79. John R., 769 P.2d 948. 
 80. John R. was a ninth-grade student when his mathematics teacher sexually abused him. 
Id. at 949. John R.’s parents sued the mathematics teacher and the school district, alleging that the 
district was liable for the teacher’s acts and its own negligence. Id. at 950. 
 81. Id. at 956–57. 
 82. Id. at 954–55. 
 83. Id. at 956–57. 
 84. Id. at 957. 
 85. Id. at 949 (“The principal question before us is whether the school district that employed 
the teacher can be held vicariously liable for the teacher's acts [of sexual misconduct] under the 
doctrine of respondeat superior.”). 
 86. C.A. v. William S. Hart Union Sch. Dist., 270 P.3d 699, 701–02 (Cal. 2012) (“On 
review, the question presented is whether the District may be found vicariously liable for the acts 
of its employees . . . not for the acts of the counselor, which were outside the scope of her 
employment . . . but for the negligence of supervisory or administrative personnel.”). 
 87. The Internet’s growing prevalence has undoubtedly assisted in the constant publication 
of issues, such as sexual harassment in schools, in a way that was not feasible in the 1980s. For 
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B.  The Media Focus on Sexual Harassment  
and the Resulting Misperception 
California courts have long held that public school districts 
cannot adequately educate students without also ensuring the 
students’ physical and mental well-being.88 This safeguarding of 
students previously included a reciprocal protection of public school 
districts from liability.89 When the John R. court made school 
districts immune from vicarious liability for sexual harassment 
committed by teachers, it also emphasized the necessity of providing 
a healthy learning environment, which included extracurricular and 
one-on-one contact between students and teachers.90 The William S. 
Hart court’s expansion of liability introduced an all-encompassing 
protection of students from sexual predators, even at the expense of 
losing a well-rounded educational environment.91 
One could assume that the court widened the basis of liability 
for public school districts because of a need to quash the prevalence 
of educator sexual misconduct toward students. However, no such 
prevalence exists.92 In fact, a national survey published by the 
American Association of University Women Educational Foundation 
(AAUW) showed that the number of incidents of teachers and other 
school employees sexually harassing students decreased from 44 
percent in 1993 to 38 percent in 2001.93 Other statistics indicate that 
sexual abuse of children in general has continued to decline on a 
national level.94 According to sexual abuse experts, all cases of child 
sexual abuse fell by more than 60 percent between 1992 and 2010.95 
                                                                                                                                      
example, within four days of its release of the results of the American Association of University 
Women Educational Foundation (AAUW) study, approximately 1,200 articles were published 
nationwide regarding it. Jo Turner, Crossing the Line: Sexual Harassment at School, AAUW 
CALIFORNIA ONLINE BRANCH (Nov. 11, 2011), http://www.aauwcaonline.org/2011/11/crossing 
-the-line-sexual-harassment-at-school/. 
 88. Leger v. Stockton Unified Sch. Dist., 249 Cal. Rptr. 688, 694 (Ct. App. 1988) (citing In 
re William G., 709 P.2d 1287, 1294–95 (Cal. 1985)). 
 89. See John R., 769 P.2d at 956 (reasoning that, under the theory of respondeat superior, 
school districts are protected from liability for a teacher’s actions). 
 90. Id. 
 91. William S. Hart, 270 P.3d at 710–11. 
 92. See AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. WOMEN EDUC. FOUND., HOSTILE HALLWAYS: BULLYING, 
TEASING, AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN SCHOOL 14 (2001). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Erica Goode, Researchers See Decline in Child Sexual Abuse Rate, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 28, 2012, at A13. 
 95. Id. 
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These statistics starkly contrast with the picture that the 
California media paints of sexual harassment and abuse of minors at 
the hands of educators. From 2012 to 2013, print, broadcast, and 
Internet news outlets have paraded a continuous flow of sexual 
harassment cases brought against California teachers and school 
personnel.96 When publications recount the sexual misconduct of one 
teacher, such as a Los Angeles Unified School District elementary 
school teacher who molested thirteen former students, there is 
understandable public concern.97 This heinous crime begins to look 
like a pattern when viewed alongside the four Chino Valley Unified 
School District teachers who allegedly engaged in illicit sexual 
relations with students.98 Concern could easily turn to outrage when 
one learns about the Los Angeles Unified School District second-
grade teacher who allegedly molested twenty-three students over a 
five-year period.99 The events underlying each of these criminal 
actions resulted in separate lawsuits that were memorialized in news 
stories within one month. This media coverage may have influenced 
the California courts to take action to quash what appears to be 
rampant sexual abuse. 
However, action had already been taken: California’s legislation 
passed the Child Abuse and Neglect Report Act (“the Act”) in 1980. 
The Act’s purpose is to protect children from sexual abuse,100 
defined as sexual assault, lewd or lascivious acts, and sexual 
exploitation.101 Under the Act, teachers, administrators, counselors, 
and other school employees are mandated reporters who have a duty 
to report reasonable suspicion of child abuse.102 If a mandated 
reporter fails to report a reasonably suspicious incident, he or she 
                                                          
 96. See Ex-LA Teacher Will Stand Trial on Molest Charges, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB. 
(Sept. 28, 2012), http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2012/sep/28/ex-la-teacher-will-stand-trial-on 
-molest-charges/?print&page=all; Sandra Emerson, Chino Valley Unified Reveals 4 Teachers 
Had Sex with Students, CONTRA COSTA TIMES (Sept. 3, 2012), http://www.contracostatimes.com 
/california/ci_21462239/cvusd-reveals-4-teachers-had-sex-students; Jason Kandel, Telfair 
Elementary Teacher Sentenced in Sex Abuse Case, NBCLA, (Sept. 20, 2012),  
http://www.nbclosangeles.com/news/local/Telfair-Elementary-Teacher-Sentenced-Sex-Abuse-
Case-170565876.html. 
 97. Kandel, supra note 96. 
 98. Emerson, supra note 96. 
 99. Ex-LA Teacher Will Stand Trial on Molest Charges, supra note 96. 
 100. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11164 (2001 West). 
 101. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11165.1 (2001 West). 
 102. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11165.7, 11166 (2001 West). 
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may be subject to criminal liability and fines.103 Consequently, 
California holds the administrators and supervisors who oversee 
hiring, firing, and retaining teachers responsible for reasonably 
suspicious acts of teachers’ sexual misconduct with students.  
Furthermore, the educators participating in the illicit acts 
continue to face criminal charges, which, if proven, would prevent 
them from teaching in the future. The criminal system may be 
flawed, as can be seen by the light sentence that Hubbell received for 
her crimes against C.A. and another student.104 However, Hubbell’s 
sentence is not necessarily indicative of a trend of lenient 
punishments. For example, the Los Angeles Superior Court 
sentenced Paul Chapel III to twenty-five years in prison and ordered 
him to register as a sex offender for life for his crimes of molesting 
thirteen former students.105 Although the range of punishments may 
indicate a judicial downfall, the individuals responsible for sexual 
harassment and those who directly supervise them are already being 
held liable. The next logical step was not to place a heightened 
burden of additional liability on school districts to compensate for 
other judicial downfalls. 
C.  The Lack of Safeguard for Our Schools 
School districts must provide students with safe environments in 
which to learn. However, the courts should also provide certain 
safeguards to public school districts so that they can accomplish this 
task effectively and without additional liability burdens.106 The 
vague “knew or should have known” standard that the William S. 
Hart court implemented is a significant roadblock to protection of 
school districts.107 Ultimately, the lack of safeguards afforded to 
                                                          
 103.  Id. § 11166(c) (2001 West). 
 104. Charles, supra note 2. 
 105. Kandel, supra note 96. 
 106. John R. v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 769 P.2d 948, 956 (Cal. 1989). The court 
reasoned that holding public school districts vicariously liable would “deter districts from 
encouraging, or even authorizing, extracurricular and/or one-on-one contacts between teachers 
and students or . . . induce districts to impose such rigorous controls on activities of this nature 
that the educational process would be negatively affected.” Id. 
 107. C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High Sch. Dist., 270 P.3d 699, 711 (Cal. 2012) The 
William S. Hart court noted that the John R. court’s concern for maintaining an environment of a 
well-rounded educational experience is outweighed by the need to hold “school districts to the 
exercise of due care in their administrators’ and supervisors’ selection of . . . employees and the 
close monitoring of their conduct.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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public school districts could negatively impact the quality of 
education and resources available to students.108 
The court acknowledged that its decision could lead to 
undesirable consequences in schools,109 including deterring public 
school districts from “encouraging, or even authorizing, 
extracurricular and . . . one-on-one contacts between teachers and 
students.”110 Yet, the court felt that these educational elements could 
be sacrificed to achieve the greater purpose of holding public school 
districts liable for their administrators’ negligence.111 The court’s 
disregard for extracurricular activities is disconcerting given the 
value of these programs. These types of activities are considered a 
strong deterrent to students’ drug use and abuse,112 an aid in 
improving foster children’s academic performance,113 and an 
incentive for student athletes to do well in school.114 As such, when 
courts determined educational quality in the past, they examined 
extracurricular activities as well as educational and sports facilities, 
class sizes, and other factors.115 Consequently, the court’s dismissal 
of extracurricular activities and one-on-one contact with students 
may be directly linked to California educators’ ability or lack thereof 
to provide their students with a quality education.116 
While the true extent of the decision’s impact remains to be 
seen, it is likely that the cost of defending similar future claims will 
                                                          
 108. Maura Dolan, Student Lawsuits Against Schools Upheld, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2012, at 
AA3 (including comments by Robert A. Olson, an attorney for the William S. Hart School 
District, who noted that this ruling would “entangle individual administrators in litigation, 
regardless of whether allegations were true,” which will inevitably affect teachers’ and the 
districts’ ability to provide quality education to students). 
 109. William S. Hart, 270 P.3d at 710–11. 
 110. Id. at 711. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 853 (2002) (Ginsburg, J. dissenting) (citation 
omitted) (“Nationwide, students who participate in extracurricular activities are significantly less 
likely to develop substance abuse problems than are their less-involved peers.”). 
 113. Stephanie Klitsch, Beyond the Basics: How Extracurricular Activities Can Benefit 
Foster Youth, NAT’L CENTER FOR YOUTH LAW (Jan. 2, 2013, 6:30 PM), http:// 
www.youthlaw.org/publications/yln/2010/oct_dec_2010/beyond_the_basics_how_extracurricular
_activities_can_benefit_foster_youth/. 
 114. Abel Vargas, Choices: To Play Sports or Not to Play Sports, MODESTO BEE 
(Jan. 2, 2013), http://www.modbee.com/2013/01/01/2515885/choices-to-play-sports-or-not.html. 
 115. Note, The Limits of Choice: School Choice Reform and State Constitutional Guarantees 
of Educational Quality, 109 HARV. L. REV. 2002, 2011 (1996). 
 116. Dolan, supra note 108. 
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be exorbitant.117 The funds that may be spent defending these 
lawsuits might otherwise be allocated to resources and programs for 
students. Additionally, public school districts may now be denied 
insurance coverage if an employee knew or should have known 
about a teacher’s illicit conduct and failed to report it, which would 
further increase the financial burden of litigation for the school 
district.118 
The vague “knew or should have known” William S. Hart 
standard puts every school employee on notice, from the janitor to 
the superintendent, of his or her duty to report even the most 
minimally suspicious activity, which makes it imperative for school 
districts to train all employees on sexual harassment and reporting 
procedures.119 California already requires employers with fifty or 
more employees, including public school districts, to provide a 
minimum of two hours of sexual harassment training every two 
years.120 However, this training is only intended to “provide a 
minimum threshold” and need not be specifically directed toward the 
types of sexual misconduct that occur between school employees and 
students.121 For example, the Los Angeles Unified School District 
provides ample information to teachers and administrators regarding 
reporting policies.122 Unfortunately, the information available 
                                                          
 117. Although costs of litigation are difficult to determine because of the role of insurance 
policies, the Berkeley Unified School District recently revealed that it spent $172,697.15 
defending a sexual harassment lawsuit brought by a high school student against a district 
guidance counselor. Anika Anand, Berkeley Unified Reveals Spending on Sexual Harassment 
Case, CAL. WATCH (Jan. 3, 2013, 12:00 PM), http://californiawatch.org/dailyreport/berkeley 
-unified-reveals-spending-sexual-harassment-case-17365. Of this total, the school paid 
$46,281.25. Id. 
 118. Patricia S. Eyres, California School Districts Liable for Sexual Harassment of Students 
by Administrative Employees, INS. THOUGHT LEADERSHIP (Mar. 17, 2012), http:// 
www.insurancethoughtleadership.com/index.php/site/article/california-school-districts-liable-for 
-sexual-harassment-of-students-by-adm#axzz27bcFqXlh; Don Jergler, Vicarious Liability Ruling 
May Impact Education Insureds in California, INS.J. (Mar. 14, 2012), http:// 
www.insurancejournal.com/news/west/2012/03/14/239526.htm. 
 119. Jergler, supra note 118. 
 120. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12950.1 (2013 West). 
 121. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12950.1(f) (2013 West); Karen J. Krogman, Comment, Protecting 
Our Children: Reforming Statutory Provisions to Address Reporting, Investigating, and 
Disclosing Sexual Abuse in Public Schools, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1605, 1623 (2011) (noting 
that while some states do require mandatory training sessions to educate teachers about detecting 
child abuse, these training sessions are generally not geared toward child abuse in public schools 
but rather abuse from outside sources). 
 122. MICHELLE KING & DAVID HOLMQUIST, L.A. UNIFIED SCH. DIST., BUL-5736.2, 
EMPLOYEE-TO-STUDENT SEXUAL ABUSE AND RELATED INVESTIGATION AND NOTIFICATION 
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regarding recognizing signs of sexual harassment is limited to the 
California Education Code’s definitions of what sexual harassment 
may entail.123 Therefore, even with training, it will be difficult to 
determine what falls within the “should have known” category until 
more people bring lawsuits against school districts. Given the 
ambiguity of this standard, it is likely that California courts will see 
an increase in cases going to trial instead of settling because of this 
question of fact. This will place an increased litigation burden not 
only on school districts but also on the already overburdened court 
system. 
D.  How the Court Could Have Avoided Ambiguity 
If the California Supreme Court had used language similar to 
that used by the New York Court of Appeals in Mirand v. City of 
New York,124 much of the William S. Hart decision’s ambiguity could 
have been avoided. In Mirand, the Court of Appeals held a New 
York public school district liable for negligent supervision.125 In 
doing so, the court determined that for a public school district to 
breach its duty to supervise, the plaintiff must establish that school 
authorities had “sufficiently specific knowledge or notice” of the 
conduct that caused the injury.126 Such specific knowledge could 
only be obtained if the school district had notice of prior similar 
conduct.127 Without such notice, the court proposed that school 
personnel could not reasonably guard against certain acts on school 
property.128 The New York courts have consistently looked for 
evidence of prior misconduct to determine if a school district is liable 
for negligent supervision.129 Because of the specificity in the New 
York standard, it more appropriately protects school districts from 
                                                                                                                                      
POLICY (2012). 
 123. L.A. UNIFIED SCH. DIST., SEXUAL HARASSMENT POLICY (2010). 
 124. 637 N.E.2d 263 (N.Y. 1994). 
 125. Id. at 267. Two students sued the board of education for negligent supervision for 
injuries sustained during an altercation with other students. Id. at 264–65. 
 126. Id. at 266. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. See Wilber v. Binghamton, 66 N.Y.S.2d 250, 253 (App. Div. 1946) (reasoning that there 
was no evidence that anything occurred prior to the alleged incident to suggest that action should 
have been taken to avoid the accident); see also Doe v. Fulton Sch. Dist., 826 N.Y.S.2d 543, 544 
(App. Div. 2006) (“District[] . . . [failed] to provide adequate supervision in the locker room, even 
in the absence of notice of a prior sexual assault.”). 
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liability than California’s vague “knew or should have known” 
standard. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The California Supreme Court’s William S. Hart decision 
inappropriately expanded liability for public school districts.130 The 
court may have felt its decision was necessary given the media’s 
skewed representation of sexual harassment and abuse as an 
epidemic rapidly spreading through California’s schools.131 
However, the court could have easily rendered a decision that 
provided protection for California students and maintained 
safeguards from liability for public school districts. The court’s 
overly broad language might now lead to increased litigation and 
associated litigation costs for public school districts. This additional 
financial burden, and the court’s disregard for school districts’ ability 
to provide extracurricular activities and other components of a well-
rounded education, could result in a decline in the quality of 
education and resources available to students. Despite the potential 
downfalls of this decision, it is still unclear the effect it will have on 
C.A. and the William S. Hart Union School District. 
 
                                                          
 130. Dolan, supra note 108. 
 131. See supra Part IV.B. 
